Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games

被引：14

作者：

Andersson, Ola ^{[2
]}

Galizzi, Matteo M. ^{[1
]}

Hoppe, Tim ^{[3
]}

Kranz, Sebastian ^{[4
]}

van der Wiel, Karen

Wengstrom, Erik ^{[5
,6
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Brescia, Dept Econ, I-25122 Brescia, Italy

[2] Stockholm Sch Econ, Stockholm, Sweden

[3] Univ Magdeburg, D-39106 Magdeburg, Germany

[4] Univ Bonn, D-5300 Bonn, Germany

[5] Lund Univ, S-22100 Lund, Sweden

[6] Univ Copenhagen, DK-1168 Copenhagen, Denmark

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2010年 / 108卷 / 01期

关键词：

Persuasion; Communication in games; Cheap talk; PUNISHMENT BEHAVIOR;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：16 / 18

页数：3

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