FIRM TAKE-UP OF A CORPORATE INCOME TAX CUT: EVIDENCE FROM VIETNAM

被引:5
作者
Anh Pham [1 ]
机构
[1] George Mason Univ, Schar Sch Policy & Govt, Arlington, VA 22201 USA
关键词
corporate tax; firm; take-up behavior; tax avoidance; development; PARTICIPATION; SALIENCE;
D O I
10.17310/ntj.2019.3.04
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines whether and why a sizable portion of eligible firms in Vietnam did not claim a 30-percent temporary corporate income tax reduction, part of a stimulus package to boost the economy during the Global Financial Crisis. Using census firm-level panel data supplemented with survey data collected for this study, If rid that only 40-60 percent of eligible firms claimed the tax cut. This low take-up rate is surprising in the context of under-reporting behavior in which businesses try in many ways to reduce their tax liability. Using a difference-in-differences approach with firm-level fixed effects, I find that nonclaiming firms were either not aware of the policy or were afraid of a tax audit. The government's policy may have boosted the economy by more had more firms known they could qualify for for a tax cut.
引用
收藏
页码:575 / 598
页数:24
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