Words Matter: How WTO Rulings Handle Controversy

被引:20
作者
Busch, Marc L. [1 ,2 ]
Pelc, Krzysztof J. [3 ]
机构
[1] Georgetown Univ, Int Business Diplomacy, Sch Foreign Serv, Washington, DC 20057 USA
[2] Georgetown Univ, Govt Dept, Washington, DC 20057 USA
[3] McGill Univ, Polit Sci Dept, Montreal, PQ, Canada
关键词
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT; JUDICIAL POWER; EUROPEAN COURT; TRADE-POLICY; POLITICS; PRECEDENT; CLARITY; LAW;
D O I
10.1093/isq/sqz025
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
The rulings of internationals courts are often reduced to "who won?," but much more is at stake. Like other institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) offers rulings that balance legal discipline against political constraints. We argue that one way in which the WTO handles politically sensitive issues is by increasing the amount of affect in their rulings. In doing so, judges provide national governments with discursive resources to persuade their domestic audiences of the legitimacy of compliance. To test our expectations, we conduct a text analysis of all rulings rendered by the institution since 1995. Specifically, we find that more politically charged decisions, such as the ones concerning nonfiscal rather than fiscal aspects of national treatment claims, are explained in qualitatively different terms. We also find that, as an issue gets ruled on repeatedly, the amount of affect deployed progressively decreases. In sum, the WTO chooses its words strategically to persuade litigants, and their domestic audiences, of the legitimacy of compliance in politically fraught disputes.
引用
收藏
页码:464 / 476
页数:13
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