Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable

被引:45
作者
Cherchye, Laurens [1 ]
Demuynck, Thomas [2 ,3 ]
De Rock, Bram [1 ,2 ]
Vermeulen, Frederic [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Leuven, KU Leuven, Dept Econ, E Sabbelaan 53, B-8500 Kortrijk, Belgium
[2] Univ Libre Bruxelles, ECARES, Ave F D Roosevelt 50,CP 114, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
[3] Maastricht Univ, Maastricht, Netherlands
[4] Univ Leuven, Dept Econ, KU Leuven, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
EFFICIENT INTRAHOUSEHOLD ALLOCATIONS; REVEALED PREFERENCE THEORY; GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION; NONPARAMETRIC BOUNDS; COLLECTIVE MODEL; EMPIRICAL TESTS; GROUP-BEHAVIOR; IDENTIFICATION; DEMAND; MARKET;
D O I
10.1257/aer.20151413
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption. We define a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable. We characterize stable marriage with intrahousehold (consumption) transfers but without assuming transferable utility. Our revealed preference characterization generates testable conditions even with a single observation per household and heterogeneous individual preferences across households. The characterization also allows for identifying the intrahousehold decision structure (including the sharing rule) under the same minimalistic assumptions. An application to Dutch household data illustrates the usefulness of our theoretical results.
引用
收藏
页码:1507 / 1534
页数:28
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