Efficient and Secure Measure-Resend Authenticated Semi-Quantum Key Distribution Protocol against Reflecting Attack

被引:13
作者
Wang, Hung-Wen [1 ]
Tsai, Chia-Wei [2 ]
Lin, Jason [3 ]
Huang, Yu-Yun [1 ]
Yang, Chun-Wei [1 ]
机构
[1] China Med Univ, Coll Humanities & Sci, Master Program Digital Hlth Innovat, 100,Sec 1,Jingmao Rd, Taichung 406040, Taiwan
[2] Natl Taitung Univ, Dept Comp Sci & Informat Engn, 369,Sec 2,Univ Rd, Taitung 95092, Taiwan
[3] Natl Chung Hsing Univ, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, 145 Xingda Rd, Taichung 40227, Taiwan
关键词
authentication; measure-resend; quantum cryptography; reflecting attack; semi-quantum key distribution; single photon; CRYPTOGRAPHY;
D O I
10.3390/math10081241
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
In 2021, Chang et al. proposed an authenticated semi-quantum key-distribution (ASQKD) protocol using single photons and an authenticated channel. However, an eavesdropper can launch a reflective attack to forge the receiver's identity without being detected. In addition, Chang et al.'s ASQKD protocol assumes an authenticated classical channel between the sender and the receiver. It is considered illogical to have an authenticated channel in the ASQKD protocol. If these security issues are not addressed, the ASQKD protocol will fail to deliver the secret key. Therefore, this study proposes an efficient and secure ASQKD protocol to circumvent these problems using only single photons. Security analysis proves that the proposed ASQKD protocol can effectively avoid reflecting attacks, collective attacks, and other typical attacks. Compared with the existing ASQKD protocols, this study has the following advantages: based on a single photon, it demands less advanced quantum devices, the communication efficiency is higher than most protocols, it reduces the length of the required pre-shared keys, endures reflecting attacks, collective attacks, and there is no need for the classical channel.
引用
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页数:19
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