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A "managerial" trade union and economic growth
被引:24
|作者:
Chang, Juin-jen
[1
]
Shaw, Ming-fu
Lai, Ching-chong
机构:
[1] Acad Sinica, Inst Econ, Taipei 115, Taiwan
[2] Fu Jen Catholic Univ, Dept Econ, Taipei 242, Taiwan
[3] Tamkang Univ, Dept Ind Econ, Taipei Hsien 251, Taiwan
关键词:
managerial trade union;
collective bargaining;
unemployment;
economic growth;
ENDOGENOUS GROWTH;
TAX RATES;
UNEMPLOYMENT;
EMPLOYMENT;
POLICY;
WAGE;
CONSUMPTION;
INVESTMENT;
TAXATION;
INCOME;
D O I:
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.12.003
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
By setting up a simple Romer-type [Romer, P.M., 1989. Capital accumulation in the theory of long-run growth. In: Barro, R.J. (Ed.), Modern Business Cycle Theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA] endogenous growth model embodying a political trade union (rather than the traditional economic labor union), this paper explores the effects of unionization on unemployment, growth and welfare by highlighting the essence of internal conflict within the union. It is shown that the conflicting interests between the leadership and membership within the union play a decisive role in the unemployment, growth and welfare effects of unionization. Given the fact that taxation is another potential candidate besides unions in explaining the poor performance of a macro-economy, we re-examine the taxation effects within the growth model with equilibrium unemployment caused by the presence of the trade union and compare our findings with those for the traditional full-employment growth model. In general, we find that the taxation effects of income and consumption crucially depend not only on the institutional arrangements for taxing unemployment benefits, but also on the way the government budget is balanced. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:365 / 384
页数:20
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