A Tripartite Game Analysis of Low-carbon Tourism

Governmental sector and tourism enterprises are recognized as two principal responsible entities for the development of the low-carbon tourism. However, such enterprises can evade government's supervision for its profits maximization due to the local government's insufficient monitoring ability and asymmetric information. Consequently, by introducing an independent third party and basing on a conceptual model, this paper has examined the internal mechanism of their interactions between those three sectors. Besides, based on the game theory, a game tripartite model in relation to the local government, the third-party and tourism enterprise has been constructed. Also, the recommendation effect of government regulation on the low-carbon development of tourism enterprises is considered. Based on the research of tripartite supervision game, the rent seeking behavior is related to three factors: the coefficient of local government's supervision ability, the regulation cost, and levels of punishment for third-parties and enterprises. Finally, this paper has provided a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution and its decision -making analysis along with determinants of these decisions.