The insularity of the reasonable: Why political liberalism must admit the truth

被引：62

作者：

Estlund, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Brown Univ, Providence, RI 02912 USA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/233804

中图分类号：

B82 [伦理学（道德学）];

学科分类号：

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：252 / 275

页数：24

共 14 条

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