Sense Experience and Poly-intentionality in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception

被引：3

作者：

Montani, John ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY | 2019年 / 33卷 / 03期

关键词：

intentionality; sensation; phenomenology; Maurice Merleau-Ponty; vagueness;

D O I：

10.5325/jspecphil.33.3.0381

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

This essay argues for a conception of poly-intentionality based on MerleauPonty's analysis of sense experience in his Phenomenology of Perception. I start by reviewing the tenuous status of sensation in Husserl's early work in order to prepare for a renewed conception of intentionality inspired by Merleau-Ponty-one that is grounded in the body's sense organs. I show how sensations accomplish a form of pre-reflective communication between the body and the world. Then, I explore how affect and the notion of a material a priori help resolve certain problems regarding sensation's alleged vagueness and unintelligibility. I conclude by advocating for Merleau-Ponty's notion of radical reflection and supplement it with insights gleaned from the analysis of poly-intentionality.

引用

页码：381 / 389

页数：9