Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types

被引：23

作者：

Ewerhart, Christian ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Dept Econ, CH-8001 Zurich, Switzerland

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2014年 / 125卷 / 01期

关键词：

Rent-seeking; Private information; Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; Existence; Uniqueness; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.019

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. (C) 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).

引用

页码：115 / 118

页数：4

共 6 条

[1] Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information [J].