INFORMATION GATHERING AND MARKETING

被引:43
作者
Bar-Isaac, Heski [1 ]
Caruana, Guillermo [2 ]
Cunat, Vicente [3 ]
机构
[1] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10012 USA
[2] CEMFI, Madrid 28014, Spain
[3] London Sch Econ, London WC2 2AE, England
关键词
MONOPOLY; CONTRACT; DESIGN;
D O I
10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00255.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Consumers have only partial knowledge before making a purchase decision, but can acquire more-detailed information. Marketing makes it easier or harder for these consumers to do so. When consumers are ex ante heterogeneous, the firm might choose an intermediate marketing strategy for two quite different reasons. First, as a nonprice means of discrimination-it can make information only partially available, in a way that induces some, but not all, consumers to acquire the information. Second, when the firm cannot commit to a given investment in ensuring quality, the marketing and pricing strategy can act as a commitment device.
引用
收藏
页码:375 / 401
页数:27
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