Quality differentiation and firms' choices between online and physical markets

被引:21
作者
Chen, Yijuan [1 ]
Hu, Xiangting [2 ]
Li, Sanxi [3 ]
机构
[1] Australian Natl Univ, Res Sch Econ, Coll Business & Econ, HW Arndt Bldg 25A, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia
[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, 9242 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[3] Renmin Univ China, Sch Econ, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
关键词
Online vs. offline competition; Market choices with respect to quality and competition; NATURAL OLIGOPOLIES; DISCLOSURE; COMPETITION; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study firms' choices between online and physical markets with respect to product quality and competition, and examine consequences of transparency policies on price competition and market structure. We investigate two contrasting forces. First, since consumers cannot fully inspect an online product's quality prior to purchase, conventional wisdom and some of the literature suggest that this attracts low-quality products to the online market (a pooling effect). On the other hand, the literature on vertical product differentiation indicates that a firm with a lower-quality product may prefer to reveal its product quality in the physical market because quality differentiation helps alleviate price competition (a differentiation effect). We show that an entrant firm with product quality lower than that of the offline incumbent may choose the physical market, whereas the entrant with a quality higher than the incumbent's may sell online. More generally the two contrasting forces can give rise to a wide range of product quality from low-end to high-end in both markets. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:96 / 132
页数:37
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