Communication and transparency - The example of the ECB

被引:6
作者
Issing, Otmar [1 ]
机构
[1] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, Ctr Financial Studies, D-60323 Frankfurt, Germany
关键词
Central banking; Communication; Transparency;
D O I
10.1016/j.jedc.2014.08.023
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Communication by central banks has two goals to fulfill: One is to be accountable and transparent to the public for its policy. The other is to make monetary policy by guiding expectations as effective as possible. Diversity of views inside the bank is instrumental for appropriate monetary policy decisions, but creates a tremendous challenge for communication. Central banks dispose of a variety of communication tools. Forward guidance seen as a revolution in central banks' communication raises new questions. Not maximum, but optimal transparency should be the final stage to strive for. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:70 / 73
页数:4
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