Two kinds of intentions: a new defense of the Simple View

被引：3

作者：

Amaya, Santiago ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Los Andes, Dept Philosophy, Cra 1 18A-10, Bogota 111711, Colombia

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2018年 / 175卷 / 07期

关键词：

Simple View; Intentional action; Goal intentions; Implementation intentions; Executive mistakes;

D O I：

10.1007/s11098-017-0934-1

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

This paper defends a version of the Simple View, the claim that someone intentionally phi s only if the person intends to phi. To do this, I raise a problem for Bratman's classic argument (Bratman in Philos Rev 93(3):375-405; Intentions, plans, and practical reasoning. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1987) against it. The problem brings into focus an evaluative dimension behind the view, whose recognition allows for an improved version of it. With this improved version, I then go on to answer other criticisms that have been raised to it.

引用

页码：1767 / 1786

页数：20

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