How much does the CEO matter? The role of managerial discretion in the setting of CEO compensation

被引：423
作者：
Finkelstein, S [1 ]
Boyd, BK
机构：
[1] Dartmouth Coll, Amos Tuck Sch, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
[2] Arizona State Univ, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
来源：
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 1998年 / 41卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.5465/257101
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The idea that managerial discretion-defined as latitude of action-may be an important determinant of CEO compensation has been recognized for some time. However, in spite of considerable work that has implicitly invoked related ideas on the sources of potential managerial contribution, a formal test of the discretion hypothesis has yet to be conducted. In addition, few studies have tested the performance consequences of CEO pay. In a sample of Fortune 1,000 firms, we found support for both a main effect of managerial discretion on CEO pay and a contingency effect, whereby firm performance is higher when discretion and pay are aligned than when they are not.
引用
收藏
页码：179 / 199
页数：21
相关论文
共 126 条
[71]   MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND INVESTMENT IN RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT IN LARGE MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS [J].
HOSKISSON, RE ;
HITT, MA ;
HILL, CWL .
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, 1993, 4 (02) :325-341
[72]   EXECUTIVE PAY AND PERFORMANCE - EVIDENCE FROM THE US BANKING INDUSTRY [J].
HUBBARD, RG ;
PALIA, D .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1995, 39 (01) :105-130
[73]   INDUSTRY INFLUENCES ON STRATEGY REFORMULATION [J].
HUFF, AS .
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 1982, 3 (02) :119-131
[74]  
Intriligator Michael D., 1978, Econometric models, techniques, and applications
[75]   THEORY OF FIRM - MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE [J].
JENSEN, MC ;
MECKLING, WH .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1976, 3 (04) :305-360
[76]  
Joreskog K., 1996, LISREL VII: A Guide to the Program and Application
[77]  
JOSKOW P, 1993, REGULATORY CONSTRAIN
[78]  
KERR JL, 1985, ACAD MANAGE J, V28, P155, DOI 10.5465/256066
[79]  
KESTER WC, 1984, HARVARD BUS REV, V62, P153
[80]   EXECUTIVE EFFORT AND SELECTION OF RISKY PROJECTS [J].
LAMBERT, RA .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 17 (01) :77-88
3456789101112