Analysis Of the Bargain Power Under Clean Development Mechanism With Game Theory

被引：0

作者：

Xia, Yan ^{[1
]}

Mi, Zhongchun ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Sci & Technol China, Sch Management, Hefei 230026, Peoples R China

来源：

ICICTA: 2009 SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLIGENT COMPUTATION TECHNOLOGY AND AUTOMATION, VOL III, PROCEEDINGS | 2009年

关键词：

CDM; CERs; bargain power; alliance; game theory;

D O I：

10.1109/ICICTA.2009.470

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

According to the problem of the Chinese's enterprise's poor bargaining power of CERs under CDM mechanism, we used the game theory to analyze the reason why the Chinese enterprise's bargain power is so weak and why they stay on the low level of the value chain. The game model first compared the market share and the CERs deal price in the individual negotiation condition with and without the CERs trading. And then discussed the CERs deal price in the alliance condition. The result shows that the alliance of the Chinese enterprises will enhance their bargain power in the CDM mechanism and supports the necessity of establishing carbon exchange mechanism in China.

引用

页码：11 / 13

页数：3

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