On the Traffic Administrative Department's Moral Hazard in the Operation Mechanism of Highway Franchise-Based on incomplete contracts

被引：48

作者：

Peng, Sheng-ting ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Jiangxi Normal Univ, Sch Polit & Law, Nanchang 330029, Peoples R China

来源：

2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON E-EDUCATION, E-BUSINESS, E-MANAGEMENT AND E-LEARNING: IC4E 2010, PROCEEDINGS | 2010年

关键词：

Highway; Franchise; Traffic Administrative Department; Moral Hazard; Game Theory;

D O I：

10.1109/IC4E.2010.83

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

Based on the assumption of public choice theory and incomplete contracts, this paper establishes a game theory model, discussing about the traffic administrative department's moral hazard in the operation mechanism of highway franchise-which is the enterprises' optimum strategy and the whole social revenue under the loss of the government's commitment. This paper argues that we should expand the transparency in the highway franchising operation and increase the cost of the government agents' rent-seeking, thus to regulate the government's dishonest acts.

引用

页码：589 / 592

页数：4