The Representation of Belief

被引：1
作者：
Wilhelm, Isaac [1 ]
机构：
[1] Rutgers State Univ, 106 Somerset St,5th Floor, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC | 2018年 / 47卷 / 04期
关键词：
Formal epistemology; Representation theorem; Belief; Credence; Scott's axiom;
D O I：
10.1007/s10992-017-9448-8
中图分类号：
B81 [逻辑学（论理学）];
学科分类号：
010104 ; 010105 ;
摘要：
I derive a sufficient condition for a belief set to be representable by a probability function: if at least one comparative confidence ordering of a certain type satisfies Scott's axiom, then the belief set used to induce that ordering is representable. This provides support for Kenny Easwaran's project of analyzing doxastic states in terms of belief sets rather than credences.
引用
收藏
页码：715 / 732
页数：18
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