The effects of redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection

被引：0
作者：
Dosis, Anastasios [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] ESSEC Business Sch, Dept Econ, 3 Av Bernard Hirsch,BP 50105, F-95021 Cergy, France
[2] ESSEC Business Sch, THEMA Res Ctr, 3 Av Bernard Hirsch,BP 50105, F-95021 Cergy, France
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2019年 / 184卷
关键词：
Credit market; Adverse selection; Taxation; Redistribution; Welfare; INSURANCE MARKETS; EQUILIBRIUM;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108595
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper studies the effects of redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection and shows that there exists a range of taxes that creates Pareto improvements relative to the (zero-tax) market allocation by increasing aggregate investment. For sufficiently high taxes, an increase in the safe interest rate can be accompanied by an increase in investment. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数：5
相关论文
共 12 条
12