Direct and indirect punishment among strangers in the field

被引：114

作者：

Balafoutas, Loukas ^{[1
]}

Nikiforakis, Nikos ^{[2
]}

Rockenbach, Bettina ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Innsbruck, Dept Publ Econ, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria

[2] New York Univ Abu Dhabi, Social Sci Div, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates

[3] Univ Cologne, Dept Econ, D-50923 Cologne, Germany

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | 2014年 / 111卷 / 45期

关键词：

cooperation; field experiment; indirect reciprocity; punishment; social norms; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; COSTLY PUNISHMENT; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; ENFORCEMENT; BENEFITS; HUMANS; NORMS;

D O I：

10.1073/pnas.1413170111

中图分类号：

O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

Many interactions in modern human societies are among strangers. Explaining cooperation in such interactions is challenging. The two most prominent explanations critically depend on individuals' willingness to punish defectors: In models of direct punishment, individuals punish antisocial behavior at a personal cost, whereas in models of indirect reciprocity, they punish indirectly by withholding rewards. We investigate these competing explanations in a field experiment with real-life interactions among strangers. We find clear evidence of both direct and indirect punishment. Direct punishment is not rewarded by strangers and, in line with models of indirect reciprocity, is crowded out by indirect punishment opportunities. The existence of direct and indirect punishment in daily life indicates the importance of both means for understanding the evolution of cooperation.

引用

页码：15924 / 15927

页数：4

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