Endogenous monopsony and the perverse effect of the minimum wage in small firms

被引：15
|
作者：
Danziger, Leif [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel
[2] CESifo, D-81679 Munich, Germany
[3] IZA, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
来源：
LABOUR ECONOMICS | 2010年 / 17卷 / 01期
关键词：
Endogenous monopsony; Minimum wage; Noncompliance; Small firms; EMPLOYMENT; LAW;
D O I：
10.1016/j.labeco.2009.07.006
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The minimum-wage rate has been introduced in many countries as a means of alleviating the poverty of the working poor. This paper shows, however, that an imperfectly enforced minimum-wage rate causes small firms to face an upward-sloping labor supply schedule. Since this turns these firms into endogenous monopsonists, the minimum-wage rate has the perverse effect of reducing employment in small firms as well as what these firms offer their workers. Thus, if there are only small firms, the minimum-wage rate makes all workers that would be employed in the absence of a minimum-wage rate worse off. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：224 / 229
页数：6
相关论文
共 50 条
12345