A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Government Compensation of Kidney Donors

被引:118
作者
Held, P. J. [1 ]
McCormick, F. [2 ]
Ojo, A. [3 ]
Roberts, J. P. [4 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Nephrol, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Bank Amer, US Econ & Financial Res, San Francisco, CA USA
[3] Univ Michigan Hlth Syst, Dept Nephrol, Ann Arbor, MI USA
[4] Univ Calif San Francisco, Dept Surg, Transplant Serv, San Francisco, CA 94143 USA
关键词
clinical research; practice; health services and outcomes research; kidney transplantation; nephrology; law; legislation; organ transplantation in general; dialysis; donors and donation: living; quality of life (QOL); kidney transplantation: living donor; organ allocation; QUALITY-OF-LIFE; IRANIAN MODEL; COVERAGE; RISK; TRANSPLANTATION; MARKET; LIVE;
D O I
10.1111/ajt.13490
中图分类号
R61 [外科手术学];
学科分类号
摘要
From 5000 to 10000 kidney patients die prematurely in the United States each year, and about 100000 more suffer the debilitating effects of dialysis, because of a shortage of transplant kidneys. To reduce this shortage, many advocate having the government compensate kidney donors. This paper presents a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of such a change. It considers not only the substantial savings to society because kidney recipients would no longer need expensive dialysis treatments$1.45 million per kidney recipientbut also estimates the monetary value of the longer and healthier lives that kidney recipients enjoyabout $1.3 million per recipient. These numbers dwarf the proposed $45000-per-kidney compensation that might be needed to end the kidney shortage and eliminate the kidney transplant waiting list. From the viewpoint of society, the net benefit from saving thousands of lives each year and reducing the suffering of 100000 more receiving dialysis would be about $46 billion per year, with the benefits exceeding the costs by a factor of 3. In addition, it would save taxpayers about $12 billion each year.
引用
收藏
页码:877 / 885
页数:9
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