The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying

被引：86
作者：
Kerr, William R. [1 ,2 ]
Lincoln, William F. [3 ]
Mishra, Prachi [4 ]
机构：
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Rock Ctr 212, Boston, MA 02163 USA
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Johns Hopkins Univ, Paul H Nitze Sch Adv Int Studies, Washington, DC 20036 USA
[4] Int Monetary Fund, Monetary & Capital Markets Dept, Washington, DC 20431 USA
来源：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY | 2014年 / 6卷 / 04期
关键词：
POLITICAL ACTIVITY; LABOR-MARKET; PANEL-DATA; ENTRY; HETEROGENEITY; IMMIGRANTS; INVESTMENT; PROTECTION; INNOVATION; PARTICIPATION;
D O I：
10.1257/pol.6.4.343
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
How is economic policy made? In this paper we study a key determinant of the answer to the question: lobbying by firms. Estimating a binary choice model of firm behavior, we find significant evidence for the idea that barriers to entry induce persistence in lobbying. The existence of these costs is further confirmed in studying how firms responded to a particular policy change: the expiration of legislation relating to the H-1B visa. Due to its influence on firm behavior, we argue that this persistence fundamentally changes the environment in which legislation is made.
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页码：343 / 379
页数：37
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