Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States

被引：352
作者：
Gompers, Paul A. [2 ,3 ]
Ishii, Joy [4 ]
Metrick, Andrew [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Yale Univ, Yale Sch Management, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Harvard Univ, Harvard Business Sch, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[4] Stanford Univ, Stanford Grad Sch Business, Dept Finance, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
来源：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2010年 / 23卷 / 03期
关键词：
VOTING COMMON-STOCK; CLASS RECAPITALIZATIONS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP; SHAREHOLDER WEALTH; TAKEOVER DEFENSES; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; MARKET VALUE; SINGLE-CLASS; RIGHTS;
D O I：
10.1093/rfs/hhp024
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We construct a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the United States and use this list to analyze the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. Our data have two useful features. First, since dual-class stock separates cash-flow rights from voting rights, we can separately identify the impact of each. Second, we address endogeneity concerns by using exogenous predictors of dual-class status as instruments. In single-stage regressions, we find strong evidence that firm value is increasing in insiders' cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights. In instrumental variable regressions, the point estimates are similar but the significance levels are lower. (JEL G32, G34)
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收藏
页码：1051 / 1088
页数：38
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