Common Value vs. Private Value Categories in Online Auctions: A Distinction Without a Difference?

被引:7
作者
Boatwright, Peter [1 ]
Borle, Sharad [2 ]
Kadane, Joseph B.
机构
[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Tepper Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
[2] Rice Univ, Jones Grad Sch Management, Houston, TX 77005 USA
关键词
bidding; private values; common values; auction design; auctions; SUBJECTIVE-PROBABILITY; INTERNET AUCTIONS; WINNERS CURSE; GAMES; RULES; EBAY; 1ST-PRICE; MODELS;
D O I
10.1287/deca.1090.0150
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
There is a growing body of empirical research that attempts to distinguish private value from common value 1 auctions. Strategic behavior for a seller/bidder in these two paradigms should differ, so the assumption of, or the identification of, the type of auction (private or common) is important for understanding the auction dynamics and strategies in game-theoretic models. However, it is difficult to recognize which of the two paradigms applies to a particular good. In this article, we briefly review some of the empirical work distinguishing common/private values using observed bidding behavior, both structural nonparametric and parametric models of auctions. We then examine the use of a priori beliefs to classify product categories. Specifically, we survey auction experts on their subjective judgment in classifying a list of consumer product. categories on a private/common value continuum. We also survey consumers, asking them their subjective assessment. Interestingly, not only are extant models unable empirically to distinguish between private value and common value auctions, but also the experts have strongly divergent opinions on classifying product, categories on this continuum. These findings raise doubts about the appropriateness of using a priori beliefs to classify a product as a common value versus a private value, and furthermore the findings question the feasibility of game-theoretic models to empirically distinguish private value from common value auctions. Perhaps decision theory would be a more useful paradigm for modeling auction decisions in practice.
引用
收藏
页码:86 / 98
页数:13
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Private information revelation in common-value auctions
    Mares, V
    Harstad, RM
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2003, 109 (02) : 264 - 282
  • [2] Entry and Bidding in Common and Private Value Auctions with an Unknown Number of Rivals
    Dakshina G. De Silva
    Thomas D. Jeitschko
    Georgia Kosmopoulou
    Review of Industrial Organization, 2009, 35 : 73 - 93
  • [3] Entry and Bidding in Common and Private Value Auctions with an Unknown Number of Rivals
    De Silva, Dakshina G.
    Jeitschko, Thomas D.
    Kosmopoulou, Georgia
    REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2009, 35 (1-2) : 73 - 93
  • [4] Reference-Dependent Preferences and Overbidding in Private and Common Value Auctions
    Runco, Mariano Gabriel
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, 2020, 9 (02) : 20 - 37
  • [5] Gender effects in private value auctions
    Ham, John C.
    Kagel, John H.
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2006, 92 (03) : 375 - 382
  • [6] Efficiency of large private value auctions
    Swinkels, JM
    ECONOMETRICA, 2001, 69 (01) : 37 - 68
  • [7] Second-price common value auctions with uncertainty, private and public information: Experimental evidence
    Brocas, Isabelle
    Carrillo, Juan D.
    Castro, Manuel
    JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2017, 67 : 28 - 40
  • [8] Existence of equilibrium in single and double private value auctions
    Jackson, MO
    Swinkels, JM
    ECONOMETRICA, 2005, 73 (01) : 93 - 139
  • [9] The value of victory: social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions
    van den Bos, Wouter
    Li, Jian
    Lau, Tatiana
    Maskin, Eric
    Cohen, Jonathan D.
    Montague, P. Read
    McClure, Samuel M.
    JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, 2008, 3 (07): : 483 - 492
  • [10] Common value auctions with insider information
    Kagel, JH
    Levin, D
    ECONOMETRICA, 1999, 67 (05) : 1219 - 1238