Crisis;
joint-decision trap;
EU decision-making;
intergovernmentalism;
supranationalism;
spillover;
COMMUNITY;
POWER;
D O I:
10.1080/01402382.2016.1186386
中图分类号:
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号:
0302 ;
030201 ;
摘要:
This article focuses on which mechanisms enabled the eurozone to escape from gridlock. At present, the EU is in a state of profound and multiple crises. Nonetheless, it managed to bring about a medium-term stabilisation of its banking system and economic governance, and a systemic implosion has so far been prevented. Considering that crucial regulations in the financial markets and economic governance are not a new idea but had been politically blocked for many years preceding the crisis, it is a major political science puzzle how and why the reforms were actually possible in an acute crisis. Drawing on Fritz W. Scharpf's theory of the joint-decision trap, the article evaluates if, how and under what conditions crisis situations actually make a difference. Can crises possibly introduce dynamics that at times help overcome stalemate? Nine EU policies are being considered. The conclusions discuss insights for the EU's overall system development.