Exploring multiple execution paths for malware analysis

被引:209
作者
Moser, Andreas [1 ]
Kruegel, Christopher [1 ]
Kirda, Engin [1 ]
机构
[1] Vienna Univ Technol, Secure Syst Lab, A-1060 Vienna, Austria
来源
2007 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY, PROCEEDINGS | 2007年
基金
奥地利科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1109/SP.2007.17
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Malicious code (or malware) is defined as software that fulfills the deliberately harmful intent of an attacker Malware analysis is the process of determining the behavior and purpose of a given malware sample (such as a virus, worm, or Trojan horse). This process is a necessary step to be able to develop effective detection techniques and removal tools. Currently, malware analysis is mostly a manual process that is tedious and time-intensive. To mitigate this problem, a number of analysis tools have been proposed that automatically extract the behavior of an unknown program by executing it in a restricted environment and recording the operating system calls that are invoked. The problem of dynamic analysis tools is that only a single program execution is observed. Unfortunately, however it is possible that certain malicious actions are only triggered under specific circumstances (e.g., on a particular day, when a certain file is present, or when a certain command is received). In this paper we propose a system that allows us to explore multiple execution paths and identify malicious actions that are executed only when certain conditions are met. This enables us to automatically extract a more complete view of the program under analysis and identify under which circumstances suspicious actions are carried out. Our experimental results demonstrate that man); malware samples show different behavior depending on input read from the environment. Thus, by exploring multiple execution paths, we can obtain a more complete picture of their actions.
引用
收藏
页码:231 / +
页数:2
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