Market power in the retail industry of natural gas for vehicles

被引：0

作者：

Garcia, John J. ^{[1
]}

Velasquez, Hermilson ^{[1
]}

Mauricio Montenegro, Carlos ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ EAFIT, Medellin, Colombia

[2] Empresas Publ Medellin, Medellin, Colombia

来源：

REVISTA DE ECONOMIA APLICADA | 2014年 / 22卷 / 66期

关键词：

Natural Gas Vehicle; mark-up of benefits; market power; retail market;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The gas distribution system for natural gas vehicles (NGV) in Colombia is highly concentrated, which gives the retail distributors market power. The pricing mechanism appears to approximate a Bertrand type of oligopolistic model, with a dominant firm setting the prices. An analysis using a Lerner index indicates that the market structure provides mark-up benefits of about 40%. An econometric analysis of the determinants of prices using panel data indicates that variables other than costs affect the retail price of natural gas provided to NGV.

引用

页码：67 / 92

页数：26

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