Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive

被引:131
作者
Sorensen, Roy [1 ]
机构
[1] Dartmouth Coll, Dept Philosophy, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00290.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Surprisingly, the fact that the speaker is lying is sometimes common knowledge between everyone involved (the addressee, the general audience, bystanders, etc.). Strangely, we condemn these bald-faced lies more severely than disguised lies. The wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive - just the feature missing in the case of bald-faced lies. These puzzling lies arise systematically when assertions are forced. Intellectual duress helps to explain another type of non-deceptive false assertion: lying to yourself. In the end, I conclude that the apparent intensity of our disapproval of non-deceptive lies is a rhetorical illusion.
引用
收藏
页码:251 / 264
页数:14
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