Three arguments against foundationalism: Arbitrariness, epistemic regress, and existential support

被引：8

作者：

Howard-Snyder, Daniel ^{[1
]}

Coffman, E. J.

机构：

[1] Western Washington Univ, Bellingham, WA 98225 USA

[2] Univ Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556 USA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1353/cjp.2007.0003

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：535 / 564

页数：30

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