Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games

被引:29
作者
Bloch, Francis [1 ,2 ]
van den Nouweland, Anne [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Paris 01, Dept Econ, 106-112 Blvd Hop, F-75647 Paris 13, France
[2] Paris Sch Econ, F-75647 Paris 13, France
[3] 1285 Univ Oregon, Dept Econ PLC 435, Eugene, OR 97403 USA
关键词
Partition function games; Core; Expectation formation; Axiomatization; EXTERNALITIES;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.012
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper proposes axiomatic foundations of expectation formation rules, by which deviating players anticipate the reaction of external players in a partition function game. The projection rule is the only rule satisfying subset consistency and responsiveness to the original partition of non-deviating players. It is also the only rule satisfying subset consistency, independence of the original partition of deviating players, and coherence of expectations. Exogenous rules are the only rules satisfying subset consistency and independence of the original partition, and the pessimistic rule is the only rule generating superadditive coalitional games. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:339 / 353
页数:15
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