Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good ill large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity, says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, we give all explicit characterization of all incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules. We then show that there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved