Deductive reasoning in extensive games

被引：13
作者：
Asheim, GB
Dufwenberg, M
机构：
[1] University of Oslo, Oslo
[2] Stockholm University, Stockholm
来源：
ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 2003年 / 113卷 / 487期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1111/1468-0297.00121
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We justify the application to extensive games of a model of deductive reasoning based on three key features: 'caution', 'full belief of opponent rationality', and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs'. We apply the model to several examples, and show that it yields novel economic insights. The approach supports forward induction, without necessarily promoting backward induction.
引用
收藏
页码：305 / 325
页数：21
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