FAKE BARNS AND FALSE DILEMMAS

被引：23

作者：

Littlejohn, Clayton ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Kings Coll London, Dept Philosophy, London WC2R 2LS, England

来源：

EPISTEME-A JOURNAL OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY | 2014年 / 11卷 / 04期

关键词：

KNOWLEDGE;

D O I：

10.1017/epi.2014.24

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

The central thesis of robust virtue epistemology (RVE) is that the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is that knowledge involves success that is attributable to a subject's abilities. An influential objection to this approach is that RVE delivers the wrong verdicts in cases of environmental luck. Critics of RVE argue that the view needs to be supplemented with modal anti-luck condition. This particular criticism rests on a number of mistakes about the nature of ability that I shall try to rectify here.

引用

页码：369 / 389

页数：21