VITALISM AND THE METAPHYSICS OF LIFE: UNDERSTANDING ENLIGHTENMENT VITALISM

In what follows I examine a series of conceptual constructs of Life, some of which we might call "vitalist", in the period roughly going from Descartes, Leibniz and Stahl (the mid to late seventeenth century) to La Mettrie, Diderot and the Montpellier vitalists in the 1740s-1770s. I shall argue for a conceptual reconstruction of this "family" of medico-theoretical views in terms of a broad distinction between "substance" and "function" claims in vitalism, i.e., between substantival and functional vitalism. The former articulates claims about life as a substance (soul, vital force, etc.) while the latter, in different strengths and varieties, presents claims about life as a function of organized beings. However, unlike in earlier work, I no longer think it is possible to strictly separate metaphysical from non-metaphysical vitalism. How fruitful and/or reasonable is vitalism reconstrued in a science-friendly form? Must the latter be a non-metaphysical vitalism? I conclude with some considerations on how a typology of forms of vitalism might impact our understanding of the emergence of biology as a science.