COUNTERVAILING POWER IN WHOLESALE PHARMACEUTICALS

被引:66
作者
Ellison, Sara Fisher [1 ]
Snyder, Christopher M. [2 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
[2] Dartmouth Coll, Dept Econ, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
关键词
MARKET SHARE; BUYER CONCENTRATION; TECHNOLOGY CHOICE; PIVOTAL BUYERS; SUPPLIER; MERGERS; COMPETITION; IMPACT; SIZE;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00408.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using data on wholesale prices for antibiotics sold to U.S. drugstores, we test the growing theoretical literature on 'countervailing power' (a term for the ability of large buyers to extract discounts from suppliers). Large drugstores receive a modest discount for antibiotics produced by competing suppliers but no discount for antibiotics produced by monopolists. These findings support theories suggesting that supplier competition is a prerequisite for countervailing power. As further evidence for the importance of supplier competition, we find that hospitals receive substantial discounts relative to drugstores, attributed to hospitals' greater ability to induce supplier competition through restrictive formularies.
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页码:32 / 53
页数:22
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