On the economics of trials: Adversarial process, evidence, and equilibrium bias

被引:44
作者
Daughety, AF [1 ]
Reinganum, JF [1 ]
机构
[1] Vanderbilt Univ, Nashville, TN 37240 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1093/jleo/16.2.365
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The adversarial provision of evidence is modeled as a game in which two parties engage in strategic sequential search. An axiomatic approach is used to characterize a court's decision based on the evidence provided. Although this process treats the evidence submissions in an unbiased way, the equilibrium outcome may still exhibit bias. Bias arises from differences in the cost of sampling or asymmetry in the sampling distribution. In a multistage model, a prodefendant bias arises in the first stage from a divergence between the parties' stakes. Finally, the adversarial process generates additional costs that screen out some otherwise meritorious cases.
引用
收藏
页码:365 / 394
页数:30
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