共 50 条
Credit Default Swaps and Bank Regulatory Capital
被引:13
作者:
Shan, Chenyu
[1
]
Tang, Dragon Yongjun
[2
]
Yan, Hong
[3
]
Zhou, Xing
[4
]
机构:
[1] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] SJTU, Shanghai Adv Inst Finance, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[4] Fed Reserve Board Governors, Washington, DC USA
基金:
美国国家科学基金会;
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词:
Credit default swaps;
CDS;
Capital relief;
RWA ratio;
Bank risk-taking;
INVESTMENT;
D O I:
10.1093/rof/rfaa021
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
While credit default swaps (CDSs) can be used to hedge credit risk exposures or to speculate, we examine another use of them: banks buy CDS referencing their borrowers to obtain regulatory capital relief. Such capital relief activities have unintended consequences, as banks extend riskier loans when they buy CDS to boost capital ratios. While capital-induced CDS-user banks achieve higher profitability during normal times, they perform worse and request more government support in crisis periods than other banks that use CDS for trading or speculation. Our findings suggest that banks' CDS trading for capital relief purposes may make these banks riskier.
引用
收藏
页码:121 / 152
页数:32
相关论文
共 50 条