Piecewise procurement of a large-scale project

This paper studies the optimal piecewise procurement of a large-scale project. In the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of the dynamic procurement game, it is found that (1) unlike the static setting, the procurer's optimal strategy depends on the number of suppliers and more importantly, it is nonmonotonic. As one more supplier participates in the procurement auction, the procurer softens competition in the initial stages by including more cost "types" while increasing competition in the mature stages; (2) this, in turn, implies that existing suppliers might favor participation of additional suppliers; (3) absent scheduling and/or resource constraints, the procurer prefers to procure the project as one piece if the suppliers' technology exhibits constant or increasing returns, and no additional suppliers are enticed to bid; and (4) the optimal dynamic mechanism can be easily implemented via a sequence of dominant strategy auctions of the Vickrey type. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.