Functionalism, computationalism, and mental states

被引：33

作者：

Piccinini, G ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Washington Univ, Dept Philosophy, St Louis, MO 63130 USA

来源：

STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 2004年 / 35A卷 / 04期

关键词：

functionalism; computationalism; computational functionalism; mental states; computational theory of mind; functional analysis;

D O I：

10.1016/j.shpsa.2004.02.003

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation Possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that. if we want to improve our understanding of both the metaphysics of mental states and the functional relations between them, we should reject these assumptions. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：811 / 833

页数：23

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