Towards the theory of general economic equilibrium

The paper proposes a model of general economic equilibrium, when some firms can influence prices by their actions. Their primitives (that is, the description of production, distribution, and consumption) of the proposed model are the same as those of the Arrow-Debreu model. The difference lies in the behavior of oligopolistic firms: it is assumed that they (as in the original Cournot model) assign their production plans. The main innovation is the description of the decision--making process on production plans by oligopolistic firms. In previous models, it was assumed that oligopolistic firms seek to maximize profits at current prices. Here, a more natural assumption is made that oligopolistic firms make decisions about production plans through a vote of shareholders. It is shown how the Arrow-Debreu model can be modified to account for this circumstance. The concept of CondorcetCournot-Walras equilibrium is introduced, combining the ideas of these three classics. The problem of the existence of equilibria is discussed. A simplified version of the model is also considered, in which each firm is owned by one agent. The simplification means that there is no need to turn to the voting.