Utilization and Selection in an Ancillaries Health Insurance Market

被引:7
|
作者
Kettlewell, Nathan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sydney, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
关键词
ADVERSE SELECTION; RISK-AVERSION; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; MORAL HAZARD; PLAN CHOICE; DEMAND; PROBIT; SERVICES; MODELS;
D O I
10.1111/jori.12250
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
I study two important aspects of the Australian private ancillaries health insurance (PAHI) market-moral hazard and self-selection. PAHI covers out-of-hospital health services including dental, optometry, physiotherapy, and chiropractic. Using instrumental variables methods, I find evidence that PAHI increases utilization, particularly for dental, physiotherapy, chiropractic, osteopathy, and acupuncture. I also find evidence of selection effects-both adverse and favorable. Several variables jointly predict a person's propensity to insure and to utilize health services. There is little evidence of self-selection based on the joint probability of different health services, which has important implications for understanding the commercial success of PAHI.
引用
收藏
页码:989 / 1017
页数:29
相关论文
共 50 条