Partial privatization and firm performance

被引:390
作者
Gupta, N [1 ]
机构
[1] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00753.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Most privatization programs begin with a period of partial privatization in which only non-controlling shares of firms are sold on the stock market. Since management control is not transferred to private owners it is widely contended that partial privatization has little impact. This perspective ignores the role that the stock market can play in monitoring and rewarding managerial performance even when the government remains the controlling owner. Using data on Indian state-owned enterprises we find that partial privatization has a positive impact on profitability, productivity, and investment.
引用
收藏
页码:987 / 1015
页数:29
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