Freedom and the Cogito

Drawing on Descartes' account of generosite, a reinterpretation of the Cogito is offered, emphasizing the role of the will. The paper's first part focuses on Cartesian ethics. It is argued that Descartes can be viewed as a Stoical thinker rather than a Baconian one. That is, he holds that theoretical contemplation is itself the primary ground of human happiness and tranquility of mind - experienced as the feeling of generosite. The paper's second part draws on the first in accounting for the relation between radical doubt and certainty. By engaging with doubt, it is argued, the meditator comes to experience generosite, assert freedom. This experience is not, then, as argued by some, merely the Cogito's ethical counterpart. It is rather the Cogito's foundation. The meditator's assertion sum follows from - insofar as freedom is, as the definition of generosite asserts, 'the only thing truly belonging to us', it consists in - the assertion of freedom.