Game Theory and the Evolution of Cooperation

被引：3

作者：

Zhang, Bo-Yu ^{[1
]}

Pei, Shan ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Beijing Normal Univ, Sch Math Sci, Lab Math & Complex Syst, Minist Educ, Beijing 100875, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY OF CHINA | 2022年 / 10卷 / 02期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Cooperation; Game theory; Direct reciprocity; Reward; Punishment; ITERATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA; TIT-FOR-TAT; PUBLIC-GOODS; ANTISOCIAL PUNISHMENT; STABLE STRATEGIES; POOL PUNISHMENT; CONDITIONAL COOPERATION; COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; DYNAMICS;

D O I：

10.1007/s40305-021-00350-z

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Evolution is based on the competition between individuals and therefore rewards only selfish behavior. How cooperation or altruism behavior could prevail in social dilemma then becomes a problematic issue. Game theory offers a powerful mathematical approach for studying social behavior. It has been widely used to explain the evolution of cooperation. In this paper, we first introduce related static and dynamic game methods. Then we review two types of mechanisms that can promote cooperation in groups of genetically unrelated individuals, (i) direct reciprocity in repeated games, and (ii) incentive mechanisms such as reward and punishment.

引用

页码：379 / 399

页数：21

共 140 条

[1] Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything [J].