Idiosyncratic risk, private benefits, and the value of family firms

被引：5

作者：

Roger, Patrick ^{[1
,2
]}

Schatt, Alain ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Strasbourg, EM Strasbourg Business Sch, 61 Ave La Foret Noire, F-67000 Strasbourg, France

[2] Univ Strasbourg, LaRGE Res Ctr, 61 Ave La Foret Noire, F-67000 Strasbourg, France

[3] Univ Lausanne, HEC Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland

来源：

FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS | 2016年 / 17卷

关键词：

Family firm; Blockholders; Idiosyncratic risk; Private benefits; Market value; LARGE SHAREHOLDER; AGENCY COSTS; OWNERSHIP; PERFORMANCE; DIVERSIFICATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.frl.2016.03.015

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Many listed companies around the world are controlled by under-diversified family block holders, who bear idiosyncratic risk in addition to systematic risk. In this paper, we assume that these shareholders require private benefits to compensate for the additional risk. We propose a simple equilibrium model of private benefits that highlights how the idiosyncratic risk borne by a family blockholder impacts the amount of required private benefits and ultimately, the market value of the family firm. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：235 / 245

页数：11

共 32 条

[1] Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades [J].