From the Extended Mind to the Digitally Extended Self: A Phenomenological Critique

In this paper, I will critically consider Clark and Chalmers' hypothesis of the "extended mind" in order to sketch a possible phenomenological account of active externalism, by following three steps: (i) I will consider Clark and Chalmers' hypothesis within the broader context of the so-called "physical symbol system hypothesis" theorized by Herbert A. Simon; (ii) I will connect the problem of the "extended mind" to that of the "extended self", with particular regard to the context of digitalization; (iii) I will take into account an explanatory dimension that has been fundamentally underrated by externalist theories: the dimension of the human body and its relationship to mind, which I understand from a phenomenological perspective. My ultimate goal is to show how phenomenology could provide the missing theoretical framework to develop a more complex and comprehensive theory of the (digitally) extended self.