How does P2P lending platform reputation affect lenders' decision in China?

被引:20
作者
Shi, Xiaokun [1 ]
Wu, Junjie [2 ]
Hollingsworth, Jane [3 ]
机构
[1] Zhejiang Gongshang Univ, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
[2] Leeds Beckett Univ, Leeds, W Yorkshire, England
[3] Leeds Beckett Univ, Fac Business & Law, Leeds, W Yorkshire, England
关键词
China; P2P lending; Moral hazard; Online platform; Reputation mechanism; ONLINE; MARKET; RISKS; COMPETITION; JUDGMENT; QUALITY; TRUST;
D O I
10.1108/IJBM-11-2018-0309
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine how the impact of Chinese peer-to-peer (P2P) platform reputation directly and indirectly (mediate effect) affects investors' (lenders) investment choices. Design/methodology/approach - Using data collected from 478 P2P platforms, this paper calculates platform reputation via a beta function after establishing a reputation mechanism by game analysis. This is followed by testing both the direct effect of platform reputation on investors' investment choices (proxying by transaction volume) and the indirect effect through credit-enhancing information using three regression models (median regression, OLS regression and random effect OLS regression). A robustness test by adding instrument variables is conducted to confirm the findings from the main regressions. Findings - In China, P2P lending platform reputations have played both a direct and indirect (through credit-enhancing information) role on investors' investment choices. Originality/value - This paper expands the boundary of P2P online lending research by not only examining the direct, but also, importantly, the indirect effects of platform reputations.
引用
收藏
页码:1566 / 1589
页数:24
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