Labor unemployment insurance and earnings management

被引:100
作者
Dou, Yiwei [1 ]
Khan, Mozaffar [2 ,3 ]
Zou, Youli [4 ]
机构
[1] NYU, Stern Sch, New York, NY 10003 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163 USA
[3] Univ Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
[4] George Washington Univ, GW Sch Business, Washington, DC 20052 USA
关键词
Earnings management; Unemployment risk; Rank and file employees; Labor unemployment insurance; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EQUITY INCENTIVES; ACCRUALS; QUALITY; RISK; DIFFERENTIALS; NEGOTIATIONS; STAKEHOLDERS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.06.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We provide new evidence that firms appear to manage long-run earnings upward in order to manage rank and file employees' perceptions of employment security. In particular, we exploit exogenous state-level changes in unemployment insurance benefits and test for partial unwinding of prior upward earnings management when benefits increase. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant reduction in abnormal accruals, increased recognition of special items and write downs, and greater likelihood of net income-reducing restatements, following an increase in state-level unemployment benefits. A number of cross-sectional results are also consistent with the hypothesis. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:166 / 184
页数:19
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