Spillovers from targeting of incentives: Exploring responses to being excluded

被引:11
作者
Alpizar, Francisco [1 ]
Norden, Anna [2 ,3 ]
Pfaff, Alexander [4 ]
Robalino, Juan [1 ]
机构
[1] CATIE, Environm Dev Ctr Cent Amer, Turrialba 7170, Costa Rica
[2] Univ Gothenburg, Dept Econ, Vasagatan 1,POB 640, SE-40530 Gothenburg, Sweden
[3] Lund Univ, Dept Phys Geog & Ecosyst Sci, Lund, Sweden
[4] Duke Univ, Sanford Sch Publ Policy, Durham, NC 27708 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Monetary incentives; Targeting; Spillovers; Economic experiments; Behavioral economics; INTRINSIC MOTIVATION; CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS; FIELD EXPERIMENT; FAIRNESS; COOPERATION; BEHAVIOR; RECIPROCITY; COMPETITION; SUBSIDIES; OFFERS;
D O I
10.1016/j.joep.2017.02.007
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A growing set of policies involve transfers conditioned upon socially desired actions, such as attending school or conserving forest. However, given a desire to maximize the impact of limited funds by avoiding transfers that do not change behavior, typically some potential recipients are excluded on the basis of their characteristics, their actions or at random. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the behavior of individuals excluded on different bases from a new incentive that encourages real monetary donations to a public environmental conservation program. We show that the donations from the individuals who were excluded based on prior high contributions fell significantly. Yet the rationale used for exclusion mattered, in that none of the other selection criteria used as the basis for exclusion resulted in negative effects on contributions. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:87 / 98
页数:12
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